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(Re)Entering the Workforce:  
An Historical Perspective on Family  
Responsibilities Discrimination and the  
Shortcomings of Law to Remedy It 
Elizabeth Roush  
INTRODUCTION  
Much of the literature addressing the current problems of work-
life balance and discrimination against those with family 
responsibilities begins with an origin story: how the recent rise in 
allegations of discrimination against caregivers and the very issue of 
work-life balance itself are rooted in ―women‘s recent entry into the 
workforce,‖ or in ―the decline of the traditional breadwinner-
homemaker family.‖ What proponents of these stories fail to notice, 
though, is that their ideas of the ―workforce‖ or the ―traditional‖ 
family are of very recent vintage; this historical myopia leads them to 
analyze improperly the problem of work-life balance and to suggest 
the wrong solutions. Their misconception is widespread, and often 
results in stereotyping and ill treatment by employers toward workers 
with family or caregiving responsibilities, especially women.  
Work-life balance issues have become a fertile source of 
discussion in mainstream news and opinion; scholarship; blogs; and 
between friends.
1
 New terms such as ―mommy wars‖ and ―opting 
out‖ are just two evocations of the strong feelings elicited by the 
topic on all sides.
2
 As individuals struggle to deal with these issues, 
 
  M.A. (2006), History, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; B.A. (2004), 
History and Political Science, Augustana College. 
 1. Some of the more fertile sites of this discussion include the Wall Street Journal‘s blog, 
―The Juggle,‖ http://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/ (last visited May 23, 2009); and MomsRising Blog, 
http://momsrising.org/momsblogging (last visited May 23, 2009). 
 2. The term ―opt out‖ was popularized by Lisa Belkin, who used it to refer to the 
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the demands of family frequently collide with the demands of work. 
In addition, employers often assume that the demands of family do or 
should inhibit some employees‘ ability to work away from home. 
Family responsibilities discrimination (FRD), the common result of 
these employer assumptions, has become a hot area of litigation.
3
 The 
number of cases has exploded in recent years, based on new uses of 
existing sex and disability discrimination laws.
4
 Compared to other 
discrimination theories, the results have been very plaintiff-friendly.
5
 
This Note argues that the story about ―women‘s recent entry into 
the workplace‖ is a flawed one, and that this misunderstanding of the 
historical interaction between work and caregiving has led to flawed 
analyses and proposed solutions from many scholars and popular 
 
phenomenon of highly educated and successful women leaving the paid workforce to stay at 
home with their children. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 
2003, at 42; see also Tracy Thompson, A War Inside Your Head, WASH. POST MAG., Feb. 15, 
1998, at 12 (discussing the term ―mommy wars‖).  
 3. Joan Williams and her group at the University of California-Hastings‘s Center for 
Work-Life Law have been prolific in their studies and analyses of this growth in litigation. See, 
e.g., Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom: The Growing 
Trend of Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 171, 172 (2006); Joan C. 
Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are 
Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN‘S L.J. 77, 122–61 (2003); Joan C. 
Williams & Elizabeth S. Westfall, Deconstructing the Maternal Wall: Strategies for 
Vindicating the Civil Rights of “Carers” in the Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL‘Y 31, 
31–32 (2006).  
 This Note is limited to discussion of federal anti-discrimination law, though many states 
independently have taken action to combat FRD. See WorkLife Law, Public Policy: Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination, http://www.worklifelaw.org/FRD.html (last visited May 23, 
2009) (describing states‘ and cities‘ attempts to address FRD); see also Stephanie Bornstein & 
Julie Weber, Addressing Family Responsibilities Discrimination, POL‘Y BRIEFING SERIES 
(Sloan Work & Family Research Network & WorkLife Law, Chestnut Hill, Mass.), Issue 16, 
2008, available at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/policybrieffrd.pdf (summarizing recent 
state efforts to address FRD).  
 4. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Consuela A. Pinto, Family Responsibilities 
Discrimination: Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, 22 LAB. LAW. 293 (2007); Williams & Segal, 
supra note 3, at 122–61; Williams & Westfall, supra note 3, at 33–52; Williams & Bornstein, 
supra note 3, at 174–85; see also infra Parts II–II.B.  
 5. FRD claims generally are more successful for plaintiffs than are other employment 
discrimination claims. According to Mary Still of the Center for WorkLife Law, a study of over 
600 FRD cases revealed a plaintiff-win rate of 50%, as compared to a 20% plaintiff-win rate for 
employment discrimination claims generally (or even a rate as low as 1.6% in one 2005 study 
of race and gender discrimination cases). MARY C. STILL, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, UNIV. OF 
CAL. HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW, LITIGATING THE MATERNAL WALL: U.S. LAWSUITS 
CHARGING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WORKERS WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 13 (2006), 
http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/FRDreport.pdf. 
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authors. Recognizing that only recently have women‘s and 
caregivers‘ carework become ―invisible‖ as part of the economy 
sheds light on the best solutions to FRD.
6
 Solutions that seek simply 
to equalize the treatment of all employees, without regard for the 
necessity of carework to the continued functioning of the economy 
and society, will not succeed. What is needed is recognition and 
accommodation of domestic work and carework as indispensable 
parts of the real economy. We can no more cease or shunt aside 
caring for children, the disabled, and the elderly than we can stop 
working for a living, yet traditional approaches to discrimination and 
work law ask workers to pretend that they have no care obligations.
7
 
The traditional approaches also tend to perpetuate the problems of 
sex discrimination by reifying a model of the ―ideal worker,‖8 who 
has a seemingly unfettered ability to engage solely in ―visible‖ 
 
 6. See infra Part II.D. Katharine Silbaugh also argues that the economic shift from 
household production to waged work converted domestic labor and carework into acts of 
economically valueless ―love,‖ rather than work. Professor Silbaugh advocates a legal 
recognition of carework as the ―real,‖ economically valuable work that it is. Katharine 
Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1996).  
 7. Joan Williams argues that the ―ideal worker‖ in the waged workforce is one who has 
no visible family responsibilities. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND 
WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 4–6 (2000). This ―ideal worker,‖ in our social 
and cultural setting, prototypically is a man with a ―dependent‖ wife at home. Women can also 
be ―ideal workers,‖ though they often confront discrimination because of their failure to 
conform to gender stereotypes, and often also face a scenario in which they effectively work 
two jobs: one paid at the workplace and one unpaid at home. The ―ideal worker‖ model 
impoverishes the lives all workers and their families in that it forces an unbalanced, inefficient 
model on their lives. Men are disallowed the balance of family involvement, while women face 
heavy burdens on their choice to work outside the home. As Professor Williams writes:  
Many Americans feel caught between two conflicting ideals: the norm of the ideal 
worker who is totally available for, and devoted to, work, and the norm of family care 
that mandates that adults be available to their children and to elderly or ill parents or 
relatives. When we talk about work-family conflict, what we are really talking about is 
not a matter of individual choice or an issue of ordering an individual‘s priorities, but a 
clash of these two cherished social ideals. An all-or-nothing workplace disadvantages 
most women (eighty-one percent of whom have children by their mid-forties) and an 
increasing number of men who want to participate in child rearing, by forcing them to 
―choose‖ between being either a bad worker or a bad parent. This clash, which affects 
virtually all Americans at some point in their working lives, is bad for men, worse for 
women, and worst of all for children. 
Joan Williams, The Politics of Time in the Legal Profession, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 379, 383 
(2006) (citations omitted).  
 8. See supra note 7. 
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remunerative work. Because of social and cultural realities, those 
who do carework tend to be women, and those who are ―ideal 
workers‖ tend to be men.  
Part I of this Note analyzes the law of FRD; reviews scholarly 
analyses of the problem and potential solutions to it; introduces an 
historical perspective on American work, life, and gender; and 
discusses the newest attempt of the legal system, in the form of 
EEOC enforcement guidance, to deal with the problem. I evaluate 
these aspects of FRD‘s history in Part II, and in Part III attempt to 
formulate a new approach to the topic that integrates aspects of the 
legal and scholarly approaches to FRD with an historical perspective.  
I. HISTORY  
Employer-defendants in FRD cases commonly argue that the 
plaintiff is alleging ―parent or caretaker discrimination, which is not 
proscribed by Title VII.‖9 This is narrowly true;10 however, many 
courts use either traditional direct evidence of discrimination or 
newer stereotyping evidence to find that parents and other 
caregivers—usually mothers11—are discriminated against because of 
their sex and parental status.
12
 The Family and Medical Leave Act 
 
 9. See Walsh v. Nat‘l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1160 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997)).  
 10. The Eighth Circuit in Piantanida presents the analysis starkly: ―an individual‘s choice 
to care for a child . . . is a social role chosen by all new parents who make the decision to raise a 
child.‖ Piantanida, 116 F.3d at 342.  
 11. Fathers can be victims of FRD, as well, especially via gender stereotypes about 
parenting roles. See Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that an 
employer‘s refusal to classify male police officer as primary caregiver was a violation of § 
1983‘s assurance of equal protection when based on gender stereotypes). 
 12. There are a variety of theories under which plaintiffs bring FRD-type claims. See, e.g., 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (discussing sex-plus discrimination); 
Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing 
sex-plus discrimination); Walsh v. Nat‘l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(discussing hostile work environment); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(discussing sex-plus discrimination); Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(discussing sex discrimination); Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, 926 F. Supp. 653, 657 
(M.D. Tenn. 1996) (discussing disparate impact); see also Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ 
Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 
831, 832 (2002) (noting that the ―similarly situated‖ requirement ―frustrates the purposes of a 
prima facie case‖ and ―fails to account for the fact that the employer‘s intent can be proven in a 
variety of ways‖; that ―courts can always recognize distinctions between employees, sometimes 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/10
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(FMLA),
13
 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
14
 and the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)
15
 also support claims of FRD. 
In addition, scholars have developed a number of proposals to 
combat FRD,
16
 and the EEOC recently issued new enforcement 
guidance on the topic.
17
 An historical perspective on domestic work 
and carework also provides insight into the problem.
18
 
A. Discrimination Theories That are Used to Support FRD Claims 
1. Prima Facie Case 
One way many plaintiffs approach an employment discrimination 
claim is by the traditional rule of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green.
19
 Under McDonnell Douglas (a racial discrimination case), 
 
making it unnecessarily difficult for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case‖; and that it can 
―improperly exclude certain types of employees from the protection of the employment 
discrimination laws‖); Claire-Therese D. Luceno, Note, Maternal Wall Discrimination: 
Evidence Required for Litigation and Cost-Effective Solutions for a Flexible Workplace, 3 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 157 (2006) (arguing that stereotyping evidence should be accepted by 
courts in addition to comparator evidence). 
 13. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2008) [hereinafter 
―FMLA‖]; see infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 14. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2008) 
[hereinafter ―ADA‖].  
 15. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2008) [hereinafter ―PDA‖]. 
Pregnancy discrimination claims also can reach FRD situations. In Walsh v. National Computer 
Systems, Inc., the Eighth Circuit held that the fact that a woman was capable of becoming 
pregnant again after maternity leave supported a jury verdict finding pregnancy discrimination 
by her employer, though she was not pregnant at the time of the discrimination. 332 F.3d 1150, 
1160 (8th Cir. 2003). Walsh‘s supervisor had treated her with ―hostility‖ following her return 
from maternity leave, scrutinizing her work hours, vacation and sick leave, and forcing her to 
―make up‖ time missed for care of her child, all in contrast to the way other workers at her level 
were treated. The Eighth Circuit refused to recognize discrimination on the basis of her 
parenthood, but affirmed the jury verdict because Walsh put on evidence that ―it was her 
potential to become pregnant in the future that served as a catalyst for [the supervisor‘s] 
discriminatory behavior.‖ Id. at 1154–55 (8th Cir. 2003). See also Wagner v. Dillard Dep‘t 
Stores, 17 Fed. Appx. 141, 149 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a ―stereotypical assumption‖ that 
pregnant women would miss work did not justify failure to hire); Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 
F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1999), discussed infra note 44; Williams & Westfall, supra note 3, at 33–
36, 42–50 (analyzing recent case law; courts‘ narrowing doctrines and strategies to avoid them; 
and uses of existing statutes to challenge practices disadvantaging caregivers). 
 16. See infra notes 46–71 and accompanying text.  
 17. See infra notes 85–103 and accompanying text.  
 18. See infra notes 73–84 and accompanying text.  
 19. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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the plaintiff must show a prima facie case, which then triggers the 
defendant‘s burden to present a non-discriminatory reason for the 
unfavorable treatment.
20
 The Supreme Court articulated the 
requirements of a prima facie case, noting that the elements are 
flexible, depending upon the circumstances of the employment in 
question: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected group; (2) he or 
she is qualified for a job for which the employer sought applicants, is 
qualified for a promotion the employer was willing to make, or was 
qualified for the job he or she held; (3) he or she was passed over for 
hiring or promotion, or was fired; and (4) that the position continued 
to exist, with the employer seeking employees for it.
21
 The 
McDonnell Douglas reasoning has been extended to sex 
discrimination under Title VII.
22
 
Most employment discrimination plaintiffs, including those 
alleging FRD, can meet this burden. Once a prima facie case has been 
made, and after the employer has offered a legitimate reason for the 
detrimental treatment, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show 
that the proffered reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
23
 In 
the wake of St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, however, the plaintiff 
must affirmatively prove that discrimination was the cause of the 
detrimental treatment, rather than simply disproving the reason given 
by the employer.
24
 The principal method of rebutting an employer‘s 
stated reason—and one that was a sticking point for many 
plaintiffs
25—was the requirement that a similarly situated employee 
(a ―comparator‖) of a different protected characteristic than the 
plaintiff‘s26 was treated more favorably.27  
 
 20. Id. at 802. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Tex. Dep‘t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981).  
 23. McDonnel Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. 
 24. St. Mary‘s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 518–19 (1993). 
 25. Applying McDonnell Douglas, the Second Circuit in Fisher v. Vassar College held 
that a ―plaintiff must show that married men were treated differently from married women.‖ 
Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1446 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Bryant v. Int‘l Sch. Serv., 
Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 575 (3d Cir. 1982)). Comparator evidence was particularly important to 
courts in ―sex-plus‖ cases: ―If Vassar was as unlikely to promote married men as it was to 
promote married women, then the only thing one could say is that Vassar discriminated against 
married people. But marital status alone is not a ground for bringing a suit under Title VII.‖ 
Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1447.  
 26. For example, if a woman with children alleged FRD, she would have to show a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/10
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2. Mixed-Motive  
Another theory under which plaintiffs may allege employment 
discrimination is mixed-motive. Under this theory, explained in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
28
 the plaintiff need only show that a 
protected characteristic was a ―motivating factor‖ in the employer‘s 
detrimental decision. Once shown, the employer bears the burden of 
persuasion that it would have made the same decision without 
consideration of the protected characteristic.
29
  
After Price Waterhouse, there remained an open question: what 
kind of evidence would suffice for plaintiffs to show that the 
protected characteristic was a motivating factor?
30
 The 1991 Civil 
Rights Act
31
 and Desert Palace v. Costa
32
 clarified this issue, and, in 
so doing, established mixed-motive as a plaintiff-friendly theory. 
Under Desert Palace, plaintiffs need only demonstrate the existence 
of the unlawful factor in the decision, and need not use ―direct 
evidence or some other heightened showing.‖33 Circumstantial 
 
similarly situated man with children who was treated better than she. This was a sticking point 
because in many situations there is no apt comparator, or because the employer might have 
treated all employees with children badly, which does not violate sex discrimination laws unless 
based on the employees‘ sex.  
 27. Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, 926 F. Supp. 653, 657 (M.D. Tenn. 1996); 
Lidge, supra note 12; Luceno, supra note 12 (arguing that stereotyping evidence should be 
accepted by courts in addition to comparator evidence). See also Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 
F.3d 640, 646 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that to establish a prima facie case, plaintiff must show 
proper comparator evidence). 
 28. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.  
 29. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. Id. at 244–45. The Court in Price Waterhouse held that 
the defendant‘s showing that it would have made the same decision without consideration of the 
protected characteristic relieved the employer of liability. Id. at 245–46 (stating that employer‘s 
showing is ―most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense‖). However, in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Congress superseded this holding; Section 107 states that ―an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even 
though other factors also motivated the practice.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Liability attaches as 
soon as the plaintiff carries his or her burden; the employer‘s ―defense‖ only limits the 
plaintiff‘s remedy.  
 30. Justice O‘Connor‘s concurrence limited her agreement with the plurality opinion in 
Price Waterhouse to cases in which a plaintiff has shown ―direct‖ evidence of unlawful motive. 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276.  
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 32. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 33. Id. at 99. 
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evidence, which usually is all the evidence that would be available 
concerning the motivation of an employer, clearly is sufficient for 
plaintiffs under Desert Palace, and, because of the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act, is sufficient to establish employer liability.
34
  
B. Stereotyping Evidence 
Stereotyping evidence is the newest employment discrimination 
weapon plaintiffs have used in FRD cases, and it has been quite 
successful. Courts have recognized evidence of employers‘ reliance 
on sex stereotypes as effective in determining when an employer has 
violated Title VII,
35
 and they recently have extended the use of that 
evidence to FRD.
36
 An employer may carry cultural stereotypes about 
proper gender and caregiving roles that affect employment decisions. 
This may take the form of, among other examples, a belief that a 
married female employee with children should not work, and firing 
her because of that belief; an assumption that an employee with a 
disabled relative would desire lighter job duties, and assigning those 
duties without the employee‘s request or consent; or a presumption 
that workers with caregiving responsibilities will not be productive or 
dedicated to their jobs, and accordingly ―micro-managing‖ or 
refusing to hire them. Employment actions taken on the basis of 
stereotypes need not be motivated by dislike or an intent to harm the 
employee to be unlawful.
37
 Especially in FRD cases, where sex and 
 
 34. See supra note 29.  
 35. Stereotyping evidence can be used in conjunction with other statutory claims, such as 
those under the FMLA. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 
(2008); see infra note 43 and accompanying text.  
 36. See, e.g., Nev. Dep‘t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228; City of Los Angeles Dep‘t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702, 707 n.13 (1978) (―Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment 
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.‖) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 
F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004); Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2004); Luceno, supra note 
12.  
 37. See, e.g., Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2007) (determining that 
the employee was rejected for promotion-transfer because supervisor ―believed that women 
should not live away from home during the work week‖); Lust, 383 F.3d at 583 (stating that 
employer‘s assumption that mother-employee would not want to be transferred because of 
children was a violation of Title VII). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/10
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caregiving stereotypes often are the root of discriminatory behavior, 
stereotyping evidence is very important.
38
  
The landmark case using stereotyping evidence to show 
discrimination is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
39
 in which a female 
employee was denied admission to partnership at Price Waterhouse 
because she did not live up to partners‘ stereotypes of femininity.40 A 
plurality of the Supreme Court held that the employer‘s reliance on 
sex stereotypes in evaluating a female candidate showed the 
employer‘s improper, discriminatory reason for the denial of 
partnership.
41
 This reasoning has been extended to FRD cases under 
Title VII,
42
 the FMLA,
43
 and the PDA.
44
 Interpreting FMLA to 
 
 38. Where FRD is alleged, classical ―comparator‖ evidence often is ineffective. Instead, it 
is employer stereotypes about caregiving and its relationship to sex, rather than the mere sex of 
the worker, that lead to disadvantageous treatment. Luceno, supra note 12. 
 39. Price Waterhouse, 290 U.S. 228.  
 40. Id. at 254–55. 
 41. Id. at 255–58. 
 42. In Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District, the Second Circuit held 
that a plaintiff alleging stereotyping discrimination need not show ―that the defendants treated 
similarly situated men differently.‖ 365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004). ―[S]tereotyping of 
women as caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence of an impermissible, sex-based 
motive.‖ Responding to the argument that sex-plus-parenthood discrimination was not 
discrimination because of gender, but rather because of family status, the Second Circuit said 
that ―at least where stereotypes are considered, the notions that mothers are insufficiently 
devoted to work, and that work and motherhood are incompatible, are properly considered to 
be, themselves, gender-based.‖ Id. (citing Nev. Dep‘t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 
730–31 (2003) (discussed infra note 43)). 
 In Lust v. Sealy, the Seventh Circuit recognized stereotyping evidence in upholding a jury 
verdict in favor of a woman who was passed over for a promotion in which she had indicated 
interest, where the rationale for her non-promotion was that it would require relocating her 
family. 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004).  
 43. The FMLA presents another avenue by which caregivers can pursue FRD claims. The 
Supreme Court found in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs that one of 
Congress‘s purposes in enacting the FMLA was to address States‘ reliance on ―invalid gender 
stereotypes in the employment context. . . . Reliance on such stereotypes cannot justify the 
States‘ gender discrimination in this area.‖ 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003). The Court found that 
―stereotypes about women‘s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a 
lack of domestic responsibilities for men. Because employers continued to regard the family as 
the woman‘s domain, they often denied men similar accommodations or discouraged them from 
taking leave.‖ Id. at 736. States had provided family leave policies for women as a result of 
stereotyped beliefs ―that women‘s family duties trump those of the workplace,‖ and accordingly 
gave unequal benefits to men and women parents; Congress meant to eliminate the use of these 
stereotypes to justify discriminatory policies. Id. at 731–32 n.5. The very stereotypes the Court 
recognized as motivating the passage of the FMLA were those that reinforced the notion that 
family responsibilities are women‘s responsibilities. ―By setting a minimum standard of family 
leave for all eligible employees, irrespective of gender, the FMLA attacks the formerly state-
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protect against stereotype-based discrimination, the Supreme Court 
found that:  
These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling 
cycle of discrimination that forced women to continue to 
assume the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered 
employers‘ stereotypical views about women‘s commitment to 
work and their value as employees. Those perceptions, in turn, 
Congress reasoned, lead to subtle discrimination that may be 
difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis.
45
  
C. Alternative Approaches to FRD Issues  
Scholars have written much about FRD and its possible remedies. 
It might seem that one way to overcome the problems of FRD within 
the current system of employment laws would be to establish parental 
or caregiver status as a protected characteristic—akin to race, sex, 
and religion—but Peggie Smith argues that this would be no better 
 
sanctioned stereotype that only women are responsible for family caregiving, thereby reducing 
employers‘ incentives to engage in discrimination by basing hiring and promotion decisions on 
stereotypes.‖ Id. at 737. See also Katharine Silbaugh, Is the Work-Family Conflict Pathological 
or Normal under the FMLA? The Potential of the FMLA to Cover Ordinary Work-Family 
Conflicts, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 193, 216 (2004) (―[E]ven if the trend in the FMLA cases 
[toward broad readings of its requirements] reflects a greater understanding of the kind of 
public-private partnership necessary for a healthier work-family climate, more legislation is 
necessary to deal with work interruptions that sometimes arise out of a worker‘s care giving 
role.‖).  
 44. The PDA also is aimed at addressing stereotypes concerning pregnancy and women‘s 
family responsibilities. As the Seventh Circuit found:  
[a] reasonable jury might conclude that a supervisor‘s statement to a woman known to 
be pregnant that she was being fired so that she could ―spend more time at home with 
her children‖ reflected unlawful motivations because it invoked widely understood 
stereotypes the meaning of which is hard to mistake.  
 We note with respect to stereotypes that pregnancy discrimination law is no different 
from other sorts of anti-discrimination law . . . . 
Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044–45 (7th Cir. 1999). The Seventh Circuit in 
Sheehan cited the House‘s Report on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act: ―[T]he assumption that 
women will become pregnant and leave the labor market is at the core of the sex stereotyping 
resulting in unfavorable disparate treatment of women in the workplace.‖ Id. at 1045 (quoting 
Prohibition of Sex Discrimination Based on Pregnancy, H. R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978), as 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4717, 4751). 
 45. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736. 
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than current sex-based anti-discrimination efforts.
46
 Professor Smith 
points out that the major vulnerability of a Title VII claim based on a 
new caregiver-status protected characteristic would be that, as long as 
non-caregivers are required to work in family-unfriendly conditions, 
employers could argue that this requirement was necessary for their 
business, even though caregivers arguably would be more distressed 
by the requirement.
47
  
The problem with creating a new protected characteristic is that 
the anti-discrimination approach would not require accommodation, 
but only non-discrimination. While non-discrimination between 
caregivers and non-caregivers is an important goal, the more 
fundamental problem, Professor Smith argues, is that employers are 
not required to accommodate caregiving needs,
48
 which are beneficial 
and necessary to society as a whole.
49
 Professor Smith instead would 
 
 46. Peggie R. Smith, Parental-Status Discrimination: A Wrong in Need of a Right?, 35 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 572–73 (2002). Professor Smith discusses Title VII litigation‘s 
limitations, insofar as Title VII litigation is framed only in terms of traditional evidence of 
discrimination. This framework has been found wanting in its ability to address FRD, and has 
been largely superseded—in litigation and in the new EEOC guidance—by a focus on evidence 
of sex stereotyping about parental roles. See id. at 571–72, 576–80. However, her observation 
that ―anti-discrimination legislation is satisfied so long as both women and men with parenting 
obligations are equally ill-treated,‖ still rings true. Id. at 572–73.  
 Though Professor Smith uses ―parental status‖ throughout her work, I have continued to 
use ―caregiver status‖ where appropriate, since the analysis would work in the same way, and 
use of ―caregiver‖ increases the notion‘s usefulness for purposes of this Note. Where it is clear 
that Professor Smith‘s argument requires ―parent,‖ as opposed to ―caregiver,‖ I reflect her 
usage.  
 47. Id. at 596–97.  
 48. Professor Smith‘s accommodation prescription is challenged by Joan Williams and 
Nancy Segal, who argue that accommodation might be a good approach if it were not for 
experience with the courts‘ narrowing of accommodation requirements, as seen in religion and 
disability discrimination cases. Williams and Segal argue that a structural approach is more 
aptly suited to a problem such as FRD, which requires changes in some of the fundamental 
assumptions about work itself, not just nondiscriminatory entry into the workplace by workers 
with a protected characteristic. Williams & Segal, supra note 3, at 83–85.  
 49. Smith, supra note 46, at 598–99. Professor Smith aptly addresses the limitations of 
discrimination theory:  
[T]he anti-discrimination principle demands that employers wear blinders when 
rendering employment decisions, so as to block out forbidden characteristics. While 
such attribute-masking has proven instrumental in dismantling discrimination 
premised on attributes such as race, gender, and age, use of this technique in the 
context of parenting would surely prove counterproductive. Employees with child care 
obligations are often disadvantaged in the workplace precisely because employers 
presently turn a blind eye towards their needs and assume that they have no parental 
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expand the reach of the FMLA, which ―provid[es] workers with 
concrete benefits as opposed to simply prohibiting discrimination.‖50 
FMLA requires accommodation, which Smith argues is more 
appropriate to the work-family conflict‘s nature and requirements.51 
FMLA indirectly addresses discrimination by challenging ―gendered 
norms and assumptions that have disadvantaged the class of women 
as primary caretakers, not the class of parents.‖52 
Naomi Schoenbaum advocates an ―information-shifting‖ approach 
to employment discrimination problems, including sex- and race-
based FRD, in an effort to make caregiving ―relevant‖ to the 
workplace.
53
 She examines how current ―employment law regulates 
what information is available to employers during the hiring process‖ 
in an effort to diminish the possibilities for discrimination.
54
 While 
perhaps somewhat effective in discouraging discriminatory hiring 
decisions, this focus on employer ignorance about an employee‘s 
personal life ―play[s] a role in defining and determining which of an 
 
responsibilities. Instead of adopting measures to codify employer disinterest in the 
parental status of workers, legislatures must do the exact opposite: they must insist that 
employers acknowledge the pervasiveness of parenting-work conflicts, with an eye 
towards adopting strategies to help alleviate those conflicts. Irrespective of whether 
one approaches work/parenting conflicts from the perspective of gender discrimination 
or parental discrimination, the problem remains the same: the anti-discrimination 
model accepts the basic premise of existing workplace structures and seeks only to 
eliminate discriminatory defects within those structures. It does not aim to create a 
new structure, one capable of valuing and maintaining a strong, healthy parent-child 
bond that will enrich both the family unit as well as the larger community. Creating 
such a structure requires a departure from an equal treatment understanding of equality 
in favor of a model that respects and accommodates the familial interests of all 
workers. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). For further discussion on the role of adequate 
information in addressing FRD and work-family conflict, see Schoenbaum, infra notes 53–60 
and accompanying text.  
 50. Smith, supra note 46, at 613. Professor Smith also notes the limitations of the FMLA, 
especially its requirement only of unpaid leave and its application only to serious medical 
conditions. Id. at 615.  
 51. Id. at 616–17. 
 52. Id. at 617. Professor Smith would expand the FMLA by increasing the period of 
mandated leave to twelve weeks and extending coverage to more workers, as well as pursuing 
generally more flexible workplaces and reduced work weeks for all workers. Id. at 617–19. 
 53. Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time that You Know: The Shortcomings of Ignorance as 
Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an “Information-Shifting” Model, 30 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 99, 101–02 (2007).  
 54. Id. at 100.  
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employee‘s traits are and are not relevant to the employment 
relationship.‖55  
Because the law has deemed employees‘ personal lives irrelevant 
to the employment relationship, employers are free to act as though 
employees have no personal responsibilities, and the workplace is not 
required to accommodate those responsibilities.
56
 The family is 
pushed into the private sphere, which Schoenbaum argues is devalued 
and feminized, and which is thus viewed as beyond the reach of 
―justice.‖ She writes that ―[p]lacing the family outside the political 
sphere denies the ways in which economic life is intertwined with the 
private sphere and how legislation and judicial action (and inaction) 
shape the family.‖57 This sharp cultural and legal distinction between 
public and private life, reinforced by the ignorance model of 
discrimination laws, is a strong root of systemic sex discrimination.
58
 
Schoenbaum‘s practical solution to this problem is to reintroduce 
personal information into the employment relationship once the 
specter of discriminatory hiring has passed, and thus combat the 
prevailing norm of the (artificially) autonomous worker. She looks to 
the accommodations for personal needs present in Title VII and 
FMLA, and finds that both prioritize individualism and autonomy 
over ―human interdependence.‖ While Title VII requires employers 
to accommodate employees‘ religious needs, it makes no 
accommodation for family needs; while FMLA accommodates 
family needs when they are discrete, there is no accommodation for 
day-to-day family care. ―[T]he FMLA expresses a view of 
dependence as anomalous and aberrant, thereby reinforcing the 
individualistic nature of the model employee and ignoring the reality 
of women‘s lives . . . .‖59 Schoenbaum argues that the ADA‘s 
―information-shifting‖ model, in which employers must ―reasonably 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 101–02.  
 57. Id. at 113.  
 58. Id. at 121 (―[A]lthough maintaining the allocation of family responsibilities beyond 
the easy reach of legal interrogation keeps the burden of . . . carework on women, it also has 
negative consequences for men by rigidifying gender roles.‖) (citation omitted).  
 59. Id. at 119 (citation omitted). Schoenbaum notes that she is ―in no way advocating that 
women should bear a disproportionate amount of child-, elder-, and homecare responsibilities, 
but failing to acknowledge and attempt to remedy this continuing truth exacerbates the burden 
on women.‖ Id. at n.112.  
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accommodate‖ an employee‘s known disabilities, provides a possible 
solution to these deeply rooted problems.
60
  
Laura Kessler takes another approach. She challenges the facial 
distinction between FRD and sex discrimination, and argues that 
FRD in fact is a form of sex discrimination. Her position undermines 
several of the main non-discriminatory explanations for work-family 
conflict and its impact on women that employers, pundits, courts, and 
scholars put forth.
61
 Gender bias may be more subtle in the current 
world of anti-discrimination laws, but one of its most common forms 
is FRD, because parental responsibilities amplify the visibility of 
employees‘ genders, and caregiving triggers its own set of 
stereotypes.
62
  
Kessler debunks two popular theories—the accident theory and 
the opt-out theory—that purport to explain neutrally that women‘s 
ability to work outside the home is disproportionately (and 
negatively, career-wise) affected by carework responsibilities.
63
 
Under the accident theory, espoused by Professor Amy Wax, 
workplace discrimination, if it does occur, ―operates at an 
unconscious level,‖ so it cannot be effectively addressed by litigation 
or regulation.
64
 Much popular attention has been given recently to the 
―opt-out‖ or choice theory, which asserts that women‘s secondary 
 
 60. Id. at 139–41. These problems are deeply rooted, as Schoenbaum aptly identifies their 
bases in liberal political theory that assumes an autonomous individual in its constructions of 
social good. This autonomous individual is a fiction, built upon hidden ―private‖ labor. Id. at 
116–23.  
 61. Laura Kessler, Keeping Discrimination Theory Front and Center in the Discourse 
over Work and Family Conflict, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 313 (2007).  
 62. Id. at 314–18.  
 63. Id. at 320–22. Kessler also briefly discusses, in a separate section, the ―time-lag‖ 
theory, which posits that there are fewer women at the top levels of work because anti-
discrimination laws have only relatively recently made it possible for women to enter many 
areas of paid work, and so we should expect that it would take at least a generation for those 
first women to work up to the highest levels. Id. at 329–30. She makes two points to undermine 
the validity of this as an acceptable theory. The first is that the ―pipeline is leaky,‖ meaning 
that, as women progress in their careers, they are increasingly more likely than men to drop out 
or stagnate, so that, given current trends, we won‘t be able to expect parity between women and 
men, or even between the number of women entering a field and those at the top. ―Therefore, 
some part of the glass ceiling is likely the product of ongoing, present discrimination.‖ Id. at 
330. The second point is that, if there is a time-lag effect, those at the top (men) should, because 
they have benefited from the legal exclusion of women, take affirmative steps to combat 
women‘s current cultural exclusion. Id.  
 64. Id. at 320 (citing Amy Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999)).  
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place in the workforce has been independently chosen by them, 
because they prefer the responsibilities of family to those of the 
workplace.
65
  
As Kessler notes, these explanations are simplistic because they 
assume that ―individuals make decisions unaffected by the larger 
structures and institutions in society.‖66 Larger structural explanations 
undoubtedly have an impact both on ―accidents‖ and the supposed 
choices women make. Kessler identifies three major structural 
explanations that underlie the neutral (or anti-woman) explanations 
for women‘s secondary place in the working world. The first is 
gender bias at work, which teaches women that their work will never 
be as valued as men‘s; this has the effect of changing the calculations 
of some women, who choose to ―opt out‖ if they can.67 A related 
structural factor is culturally based expectations about gender that 
―influence[] what individuals deem possible or appropriate,‖ so 
women tend to choose education and career paths that lead to second-
tier work.
68
 Finally, the persistent wage differential between men and 
women
69
 probably leads women and heterosexual couples to 
―marginalize [women‘s] wage labor‖ in a way that supports a 
decision to leave or minimize paid work.
70
  
All of these structural factors identified by Kessler operate to 
influence or constrain women‘s choices, undermining the ―accident‖ 
 
 65. Kessler, supra note 61, at 320–21. As Kessler and others have pointed out, Belkin‘s 
(and others‘) opt-out stories focus on well paid, highly educated, married women, who have the 
financial resources and support to ―opt out‖ if they wish to do so. This does not explain why 
women‘s achievement gap cuts across all wage and education levels. In addition, Kessler notes, 
most women with children do not opt out; the majority of mothers work outside the home. 
Kessler, supra note 61, at 321–22.  
 66. Kessler, supra note 61, at 322.  
[These stories] are not neutral, empirical descriptions of the world. They are stories 
that incorporate political and moral judgments about the proper relationship of 
individuals to the larger society. They fundamentally embrace the liberal and 
neoliberal assumption that individuals are independent, autonomous, unencumbered 
beings . . . [and] hide the significant role of powerful institutions such as employers, 
the state, and the family in women‘s secondary status at work. 
Kessler, supra note 61, at 331. See also Schoenbaum, supra note 53, at 116–23.  
 67. Kessler, supra note 61, at 322–23.  
 68. Kessler, supra note 61, at 323.  
 69. Kessler argues that ―human capital explanations simply do not explain the entire 
differential in pay between women and men in the same jobs.‖ Kessler, supra note 61, at 323.  
 70. Kessler, supra note 61, at 323–24.  
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and, especially, the ―opt-out‖ ideas.71 Ultimately, Kessler argues, 
scholars, legislatures, courts, and the public need to keep structural 
discrimination in mind when evaluating work law and legal 
approaches to family responsibilities, rather than using the tropes of 
―accident‖ or ―choice‖ to avoid making substantive changes.72  
D. An Historical Perspective 
The historical perspective on work and family is one that largely 
has been ignored in the world of legal scholarship,
73
 but it can be 
 
 71. Employment law also plays a role, in that ―[w]omen make decisions about wage work 
within the context of our country‘s inadequate employment discrimination laws and family 
leave policies.‖ Kessler, supra note 61, at 324. Kessler argues that the employer-friendly 
interpretations and limitations on Title VII, the PDA, and FMLA; unregulated mandatory 
overtime; and the refusal of legislatures to recognize a right to flexible work all support the 
status quo, and discourage those women who would choose to engage in paid work. Kessler, 
supra note 61, at 324–27. Kessler does note the ―promising‖ recent progress in FRD litigation, 
especially in the work of Joan Williams and the Center for WorkLife Law, asserting that it may 
be the ―most realistic‖ of the approaches to the problem. Kessler, supra note 61, at 325–26. 
 Another view of how employment law indirectly affects decisions about wage work is 
offered by Nancy Dowd, who critiques the apparent—but false—‖neutrality‖ of the law toward 
work and family life. Dowd argues that the law encourages mutually reinforcing visions of both 
the family and work that reify a ―traditional‖ male-breadwinner, female-caregiver family. Given 
the power of the legal context, it is clear that any changes in FRD or work-life policy in general 
need to be rooted in the law. Nancy Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 
ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 469–75 (1990).  
 72. Williams and Segal, though criticizing Kessler‘s suggestion in another article that the 
best solution for FRD is accommodation, also argue for a structuralist approach; one based in 
―rights talk,‖ which, they argue, has the potential to change the structural and cultural 
assumptions that underlie FRD and work-life conflict. Williams & Segal, supra note 3, at 113–
22.  
 73. There have been some notable legal studies that analyze, from an historical 
perspective, the changes in conceptions of work, home, and gender. Katharine Silbaugh‘s work 
is among them. Silbaugh argues, like the earliest feminists, that housework is real work, without 
assuming that either waged work or housework (what I would label domestic labor or 
carework/caregiving) is a better route for women. Silbaugh, supra note 6. Her historical 
analysis relies, in part, on Jeanne Boydston‘s work, discussed infra notes 74–84 and 
accompanying text, to show how housework was transformed in the public mind from ―labor 
into love,‖ by the increasing focus on the male-centered cash economy. Silbaugh, supra note 
61, at 23. With the rise of cash-based economics and the norm of waged work, Silbaugh argues, 
non-waged labor ceased to be seen as work. The rising ―cult of domesticity‖ turned women‘s 
housework into acts of love, rather than labor. As she puts it, echoing Boydston, ―[t]he idea that 
women serve an essential moral and spiritual role developed, but it accompanied the idea that 
women were economic dependents without cash. Their emotional role was praised, but their 
material labor was obscured.‖ Silbaugh, supra note 6, at 23–24. 
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helpful in understanding the causes of, and hence, some possible 
remedies for, family responsibilities discrimination. Jeanne 
Boydston‘s work is especially pertinent here.74 Boydston argues that 
the ―gradual emergence in the United States of an industrial 
economy,‖ beginning in the colonial era, coincided with ―the 
departure of any general social acknowledgement of [women‘s] 
material value to the family [and with it] . . . the traditional basis of a 
wife‘s claim to some voice in the distribution of economic resources 
and to social status as a ‗productive‘ member of society.‖75 As the 
work performed by women, which included both certain ―productive‖ 
work and carework, was devalued, carework generally became an 
―invisible‖ part of the economy; this ―invisibility‖ can be seen as the 
root of workplace FRD.  
Boydston recognizes that this shift was due not only to 
industrialization itself, but also to ―changing relations of gender and 
labor in the preindustrial period.‖76 Her research shows that between 
the early settlement of the American colonies and the middle of the 
seventeenth century, the social recognition of women‘s domestic 
 
 Reva Siegel‘s work on the early women‘s movement focuses on the movement‘s mid- to 
late-nineteenth century efforts to reestablish women‘s household work as real labor. Reva 
Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household 
Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994). The early women‘s rights movement took as 
one of its primary goals legislation recognizing joint property in marital assets, which, 
Professor Siegel asserts:  
amounted to an effort to secure compensation for wives‘ contribution to the family 
economy—in terms unbiased by assumptions of gender caste, as market measures of 
value were. Consider again the justification for the claim offered at the 1851 
Worcester convention: ―That since the economy of the household is generally as much 
the source of family wealth as the labor and enterprise of man, therefore the wife 
should . . . have the same control over the joint earnings as her husband . . . .‖ The 
movement was in effect asserting that a wife‘s labor contributed as much to family 
wealth as the income earned by a husband from his labors-notwithstanding what the 
market might measure as its worth. 
Id. at 1130 (internal citation omitted). Professor Siegel looks to the ways in which even laws 
allowing women access to their own wages, though seen as progressive to the modern eye, 
served to delegitimize women‘s caregiving and domestic labor: ―legislatures emancipating a 
wife‘s ‗separate‘ or ‗personal‘ labor [outside the home] intended to exclude work performed for 
the family.‖ Id. at 1181. 
 74. JEANNE BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF 
LABOR IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (Oxford 1990). 
 75. Id. at xi.  
 76. Id. at 4.  
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work changed dramatically, even while the work itself remained 
largely the same.
77
 This deep shift, caused by 
[A] growing sense of constriction in material opportunity and 
the emergence of essentially commercial habits of mind. These 
shifts in the culture of colonial society heightened the 
association of men, and thus non-carework, with the symbols 
of economic activity and profoundly weakened the ability of 
women, and thus caregivers in general, to lay claim to the 
status of ‗worker.‘78  
This ―served to slowly undermine the visibility of housework,‖79 such 
that, on ―the eve of the Revolutionary crisis, colonists had largely 
ceased to perceive housewifery as a part of the real economy.‖80  
The ―constriction in material opportunity,‖ a result of declining 
amounts of available land and increasing population, led to ―an 
 
 77. Id. at 4–29. Boydston finds that, over this period, and across the differences between 
rural and urban life: 
[W]omen remained responsible for cooking, cleaning, fire-tending, food storage, the 
manufacture of a wide range of household items, the care of household linens and 
clothing, and child rearing, while their husbands still provided direct labor to the 
family in the form of household repairs, some domestic manufacture (mending shoes, 
for example, or wood-working), and perhaps some shopping. 
Id. at 15.  
 There were differences between city and country life, but they focused less on the types of 
tasks allotted to each sex than on practical differences between the ways food and other 
necessities were obtained:  
On farms, men were responsible for providing grain and fuel and the permanent 
structures of the homestead. They managed the pastures and the out-buildings; made 
some of the equipment used by themselves and their wives; saw to the care and 
maintenance of their own tools; and supervised the work of older sons and male 
servants. Women were responsible for providing fruits, vegetables, dairy products, and 
fowl; for manufacturing various goods needed by the family; for managing the 
distribution of goods in the household; for the daily care of the house proper, the home 
lot, and much of their own equipment; and for training and supervising infants, older 
daughters, and female servants. In the business of meeting their separate obligations to 
the family, both men and women grew food for the family, engaged in commerce and 
manufacturing, and provided maintenance services.  
Id. at 11–12.  
 78. Id. at 20–21.  
 79. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).  
 80. Id. at 18.  
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increased cash dependency‖ and ―increased market contact,‖81 both 
of which created a ―widespread dissociation of wives and wives‘ 
work from the symbols of economic value.‖82 Women came to be 
seen as mere dependents of men, performing work that was merely 
private and domestic, unrelated to the larger economy.
83
 Boydston 
tracks the growing invisibility of women‘s work through the 
antebellum era, noting that although such work made possible the 
great advances of industrialization, it was systematically 
marginalized and ―pastoralized.‖84 Over this period, carework 
became something that was done by dependents—not by producers—
and lost its status as valued work; caregivers themselves were 
marginalized from the ―real‖ economy.  
 
 81. Id. at 22–23.  
 82. Id. at 24. ―[T]he developing reliance on money weakened the visible parallels between 
men‘s and women‘s work and reinforced the apparent contrasts between their contributions to 
household life.‖ Because the legal system placed money (regardless of whose work earned it), 
in the hands of men, women were not associated with it; the rise of money thus signaled a 
decline in the visibility of women‘s work. Id. at 26–27. See infra note 84. Boydston goes on to 
argue that in the period following the colonial era, up to the antebellum period, the nation‘s 
market orientation deepened, changing both the material and ideological frameworks in which 
women‘s work (and other domestic work or carework) was understood and made invisible to 
the ―real‖ economy. JEANNE BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE 
IDEOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 27–29 (Oxford 1990). 
 83. The shift in the meaning and use of the word ―economy‖ over this period is 
illustrative. Boydston finds that, at the beginning of the period ―[a]ll labor that contributed to 
the material viability of family life—whether it was growing food or cooking it, tending 
livestock or tending children—was ‗economic.‘‖ Id. at 18. ―‗Economy,‘ then, was the process 
of ‗stewarding‘ (or conserving or enriching) material resources to the end that the general 
welfare of both household and community was strengthened.‖ Id. at 20. The ―last half of the 
colonial period‖ was marked by ―the emergence of a new cultural understanding of what 
constituted ‗economic‘ and what constituted ‗non-economic‘ terrain. Eventually, the core 
cultural definition of ‗economy‘ itself—the household—would change.‖ Id. at 27.  
 84. Boydston uses the term ―pastoralization‖ in the sense defined by Raymond Williams, 
who found that ―the pastoral myth functioned to obscure the ravages to the rural peasantry 
attendant upon the formation of a landed gentry.‖ Id. at 147. Pastoralization of domestic labor, 
then, functions to ―naturalize‖ the social realities of housework and to hide their origins and 
effects—to make it invisible as labor. Id. at 147–50. This idea is restated another way in 
Silbaugh‘s ―labor into love‖ formation. Silbaugh, supra note 6. 
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E. EEOC Guidance  
The EEOC recently issued
85
 new enforcement guidance
86
 
―intended to assist employers, employees, and Commission staff in 
determining whether discrimination against persons with caregiving 
responsibilities constitutes unlawful disparate treatment‖ under 
federal anti-discrimination laws, especially Title VII and the ADA.
87
 
The Guidance recognizes that many family caregivers—especially 
among low-income families, whose members have less bargaining 
power and must ―face inflexible employer policies‖88—have 
difficulty managing the competing responsibilities of family and 
work.
89
 The ―Questions and Answers‖ accompanying the Guidance 
explicitly state that the Guidance does not create a new protected 
class.
90
  
What is new under the Guidance, however, is an explicit agency 
statement that disparate treatment of workers with family 
responsibilities that is rooted in stereotypes about a protected 
characteristic violates Title VII and the ADA. In short, stereotyping 
evidence can show sex or disability discrimination related to family 
responsibilities.
91
 The Guidance gathers recent case law
92
 recognizing 
 
 85. EEOC Enforcement Guidance does not have the same status as do agency regulations 
made pursuant to a congressional delegation of lawmaking authority. See infra note 122; see 
also Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1937 (2006) (analyzing the Supreme Court‘s lack of explicit deference to EEOC 
Guidance); Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, The Courts, and Employment Discrimination 
Policy: Recognizing the Agency’s Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 
51 (explaining the level of deference given by courts to EEOC Guidance); Theodore W. Wern, 
Note, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the 
ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533 (1999) (noting that EEOC 
agency interpretations such as Enforcement Guidance receive little deference from courts). 
 86. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm‘n, Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful 
Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, No. 915.002 (2007), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html [hereinafter ―Guidance‖].  
 87. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm‘n, Questions and Answers about EEOC‘s 
Enforcement Guidance on Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving 
Responsibilities (2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ policy/docs/qanda_caregiving.html 
[hereinafter ―Q & A‖].  
 88. Guidance, supra note 86, at 5. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Q & A, supra note 87. 
 91. Guidance, supra note 86; Q & A, supra note 87. Attorneys in the field were quick to 
notice and analyze the Guidance. See, e.g., Carmelyn P. Malalis & Linda A. Neilan, A 
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stereotyping evidence to prove sex discrimination related to 
caregiving, and also notes that ―[s]ex-based stereotyping about 
caregiving responsibilities is not limited to childcare and includes 
other forms of caregiving, such as care of a sick parent or spouse.‖93 
In addition, the EEOC states that ―while comparative evidence is 
often useful, it is not necessary to establish a violation.‖94 The 
Guidance compiles and summarizes the most important FRD case 
law, but does not establish any new rules.
95
  
Employers can be liable for sex or disability discrimination
96
 in 
several ways under the Guidance‘s consolidation of Title VII and 
ADA FRD law: female caregivers might be adversely treated because 
of stereotypes;
97
 women may be adversely treated because they are 
 
Crackdown on Caregiver Discrimination TRIAL, Aug. 2007, at 32; Michael Newman & Shane 
Crase, Family Responsibilities Discrimination FED. LAW., Sept. 2007, at 14; Lynne Anne 
Anderson & Laura S. Grosshans, Family Responsibilities Discrimination: What You Need to 
Know, THE METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., July 2007, at 30, available at http://www.metro 
corpcounsel.com/pdf/2007/July/30.pdf; Robert J. Chovanec, Stereotyping, Jury Trials and 
Manager Training, HUM. RES. ALERT (WARNER, Norcross & Judd), Winter 2007, available at 
http://www.wnj.com/hr_alert_winter_2007.  
 92. Guidance, supra note 86, at nn.31–32, 34, 37–39.  
 93. Id. at 6 (citing Nev. Dep‘t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003)).  
 94. Guidance, supra note 86, at 8 (citing Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004)).  
 95. The EEOC, of course, is not empowered to do so. See Wern, supra note 85. The 
Guidance notes that ―Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based solely on parental or other 
caregiver status, so an employer does not generally violate Title VII‘s disparate treatment 
proscription if, for example, it treats working mothers and working fathers in a similar 
unfavorable (or favorable) manner as compared to childless workers.‖ Guidance, supra note 86, 
at 11.  
 96. Disability-caregiver discrimination against a worker can occur because of the 
worker‘s association with a disabled person, in addition to the more obvious discrimination 
against the disabled person herself. See, e.g., Guidance, supra note 86, at 27–28, 31. 
 97. See id. at 8–21. The Guidance thoroughly discusses discrimination against female 
caregivers, perhaps recognizing that they make up the bulk of FRD claims (and thus the bulk of 
the case law on which the Guidance relies), or perhaps because the evidence and analysis 
applicable to female caregiver discrimination applies equally to other forms of caregiving.  
 Under the Guidance, women might be able to show that they were discriminated against on 
the basis of sex by use of evidence showing the use of stereotypes about caregivers, better 
treatment for non-caregivers, or unfavorable treatment connected with caregiving or pregnancy. 
Id. at 9–10. The Guidance specifically notes three types of sex-based FRD.  
 The first of these is better treatment of male caregivers than of similarly-situated female 
caregivers. Id. at 10–11.  
 The second type of sex-based FRD is stereotype-motivated disparate treatment of female 
caregivers, which may include situations in which the employer has a mixed motive in the 
disparate treatment. Employers may not use their own gender-based assumptions about the 
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pregnant or may become pregnant;
98
 male caregivers may be 
adversely treated on the basis of sex-role stereotypes;
99
 women of 
color may be adversely treated on the basis of either sex or race 
stereotypes, or a combination of the two types;
100
 the caregivers of 
those with disabilities may be adversely treated;
101
 and all caregivers 
may be subjected to a hostile work environment.
102
 The Guidance 
also notes that employees are protected from retaliation for 
complaining about stereotyping or filing or participating with an 
EEOC charge investigation. This retaliation can take ―any form . . . 
 
actual or proper role of woman caregivers to justify treating them unfavorably. Id. at 11–18. 
Employers may not assume, based on the knowledge that women perform more household 
tasks, that female employees will be ―less dependable‖ than male employees. See id. at 12–13. 
In addition, supervisors should not give unfavorable assignments to caregivers because of 
assumptions about their dedication to work, or treat them less favorably because of their 
participation in a flexible schedule program on the basis of a similar assumption. See id. at 14–
16. Finally, so-called ―benevolent‖ employment decisions, intended to ―help‖ women be better 
caregivers, are disallowed. See id. at 16–18.  
 The third type of sex-based FRD is subjective performance evaluations influenced by a 
supervisor‘s preconceived notions about caregivers‘ ability to do good work; this is also 
disallowed in the Guidance. See id. at 19–21.  
 98. See id. at 21–24. ―Title VII prohibits an employer from basing an adverse employment 
decision on stereotypical assumptions about the effect of pregnancy on an employee‘s job 
performance, regardless of whether the employer is acting out of hostility or a belief that it is 
acting in the employee‘s best interest.‖ Id. at 22. Even if a pregnant worker temporarily is 
unable to perform certain physical tasks, she should be treated no differently than other 
temporarily restricted workers. See id. at 22.  
 99.  See id. at 24–25. Quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 
(2003), the Guidance notes that the Supreme Court recognized ―mutually reinforcing‖ 
stereotypes that harm men as caregivers, as well as women. These stereotypes can ―lead to the 
perception that a man who works part time is not a good father,‖ because of his departure from 
the ―breadwinner‖ stereotype. See Guidance, supra note 86, at 24. In addition, men may not be 
denied required family leave or available part-time work arrangements on the basis that they are 
not mothers. See id. at 25.  
 100. See id. at 25–26. Women of color may be particularly susceptible to FRD, given that 
employers may combine their stereotypes about female caregivers with those about women of 
color. See id. at 25–27.  
 101. See id. at 27–28. Under the Guidance‘s interpretation of the ADA, employers may not 
assume that disabled persons‘ caregivers will be less reliable employees and use those 
stereotypes to treat them unfavorably. See id. at 27–28. 
 102. See id. at 28–31. The Guidance reiterates that it is unlawful to subject employees with 
caregiving responsibilities to ―offensive comments or other harassment because of‖ a protected 
characteristic, and that the ―same legal standards that apply to other forms of harassment 
prohibited by the EEO statutes also apply to unlawful harassment directed at caregivers or 
pregnant workers.‖ See id. at 28.  
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that would be reasonably likely to deter someone from engaging in 
protected activity.‖103  
II. ANALYSIS  
FRD has been remarkably vulnerable to attacks by plaintiffs, 
relative to other employment law claims.
104
 While courts were less 
receptive to traditional interpretations of the employment 
discrimination statutes for FRD claims, the more recent judicial 
recognition of stereotyping discrimination theories has made 
recovery more likely for employee-plaintiffs. Unlike a plaintiff who 
frames a complaint as satisfying the prima facie burden of McDonnell 
Douglas
105
 and Hicks
106—and who therefore must affirmatively prove 
discrimination and disprove all possible neutral reasons for the 
discrimination
107—a mixed-motive plaintiff under Desert Palace108 
need only show that his or her protected characteristic was a part of 
the decision to take a detrimental action, without ―direct evidence‖ or 
a comparator.
109
 This is a much easier burden to meet. 
In addition, the recent recognition of stereotyping as an 
incarnation of sex, pregnancy, family and medial leave, and disability 
discrimination,
110
 has opened the door for courts to more effectively 
reach FRD. Since family responsibilities and caregiving status are not 
themselves protected characteristics, it is important that the law 
recognize stereotypes about sex that relate to caregiving as 
discrimination.  
There remain obvious shortcomings in the law‘s ability to deal 
with these work-family conflicts. First among these is that, while the 
prospect of litigation may have a deterrent effect on employers‘ 
 
 103. Guidance, supra note 86, at 31 (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 
126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006)).  
 104. See Still, supra note 5.  
 105. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See supra notes 19–23 and 
accompanying text.  
 106. St. Mary‘s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). See supra note 24 and 
accompanying text.  
 107. See supra text accompanying note 24.  
 108. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 109. Id. at 99. See text accompanying notes 31–34. 
 110. See supra notes 35–45 and accompanying text.  
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decisions to engage in overt and intentional FRD, employees must 
actually initiate litigation in order to recover—bearing at least a fifty 
percent risk of losing if they do so.
111
 Many employees who are 
subject to FRD will not exert the time and expense to challenge an 
employer‘s action. Moreover, litigation does not strike at the cultural 
and social roots of FRD. Without addressing the causes of FRD, all 
that can be accomplished is the minimization of overt discrimination 
against caregivers.
112
  
Many commentators are on the right track, with helpful 
suggestions for moving beyond the status quo to combat FRD. 
Smith,
113
 Schoenbaum,
114
 and Kessler
115
 call for more information 
about an employee‘s ―private‖ life and responsibilities to be 
recognized as relevant to the workplace. Smith argues that the FMLA 
model requiring employer accommodation of caregiving is the 
appropriate direction, preferable to continued reliance on 
discrimination theory, which forces employers to wear ―blinders‖ 
about employees‘ ―private‖ lives.116 Schoenbaum elaborates on the 
idea that under current law employees‘ caregiving responsibilities are 
irrelevant to the workplace, arguing that this rigid delineation of work 
life and home life devalues and feminizes caregiving.
117
 Kessler‘s 
approach is also important, as it adds to our understanding of the 
theories that often are put forth as benign or legally unreachable 
explanations of FRD and work-family conflict. She helps to 
dismantle the claims that the law is inadequate and inappropriate for 
dealing with ―personal‖ or ―private‖ issues.118 Each of these studies 
 
 111. See supra note 5.  
 112. Judges and juries themselves are products of our culture, and often bear the same 
misunderstandings of history as do employers and the general population. Especially in the 
arena of employment, ―basic fairness concerns may dominate decisionmaking . . . . Simply put, 
judges believe that they do not need an agency telling them who has or has not suffered 
wrongful discrimination . . . .‖ Wern, supra note 85, at 1579. Judges, like all people, are 
informed by the ―common sense‖ of cultural understandings. So long as historical myths 
perpetuate and inform people‘s understandings of work, gender, and caregiving, litigation will 
remain a subpar remedy. 
 113. See supra note 46.  
 114. See supra note 53.  
 115. See supra notes 61–72.  
 116. See Smith, supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Schoenbaum, supra notes 53–60 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Kessler, supra notes 61–72 and accompanying text. 
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reveals how the idea that caregiving is irrelevant to one‘s ―real‖ 
employment both promotes and excuses FRD.  
The new case law-based Guidance
119
 is a step toward tackling 
FRD. By establishing the applicability of stereotyping discrimination 
theories to FRD, the EEOC shows its support for combating FRD,
120
 
and possibly increases the likelihood that judges and attorneys will 
take the claims more seriously.
121
 However, because EEOC 
 
 119. See Guidance, supra note 86; see also supra notes 86–103 and accompanying text. 
 120. The Guidance, by including disabilities discrimination in the category of actionable 
FRD claims, and by explicitly including men as potential victims of FRD, performs an 
important function of partially ―de-gendering‖ carework. While the Guidance acknowledges 
that women are the most common victims of FRD because of their social and cultural status as 
primary caregivers, it helps to deconstruct the idea that only women have responsibilities for 
caregiving.  
 121. Most of the attorneys who have published practitioner-oriented analyses of the 
Guidance have focused on its terms, and have not delved deeply into employers‘ practical 
responses to it. See supra note 91. However, several attorneys discussed interpretations of and 
approaches to the Guidance. On the management side, the emphasis is on retraining managers 
in order to avoid being found liable for discrimination, not necessarily on teaching managers to 
avoid FRD itself. Chovanec advises that:  
[E]mployers should also make sure that managers know that a stray comment, a badly 
timed discharge or an unexplained difference in treatment between a person with a 
protected characteristic and someone else can result in a very expensive, time-
consuming and risky legal proceeding. Managers who understand and internalize these 
rules are much less likely to land their employers in court. . . . That‘s why training, 
role-playing, and regular reinforcement are good things when it comes to protecting 
your managers against self-inflicted discrimination claims. You can‘t keep someone 
from making a false discrimination claim, but you can avoid creating evidence that 
makes you look guilty even though you‘re not. 
Chavanec, supra note 91.  
 Another common piece of advice addressed to employers reiterates the fact that the 
Guidance creates no new legal theories, and stresses that decisions can still be made on the 
basis of family responsibilities, so long as those decisions are not tied to sex or race. See, e.g., 
Susan L. Nardone, New EEOC Enforcement Guidance Addresses Unlawful Discrimination 
Against Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, July 6, 2007, http://www.gibbonslaw.com/ 
news_publications/articles/php (click ―Employment Law‖; then find article by title; Courtney L. 
Tawresey, EEOC Issues Guidance Concerning Disparate Treatment of Employees with 
Caregiving Responsibilities, Dec. 1, 2007, http://www.rothgerber.com/showarticle.aspx?Show= 
933) (―The guidance does not prohibit an employer from legitimately assessing the employee‘s 
actual work performance and taking action, even where the poor work performance may be 
directly tied to caregiving responsibilities. Nor is there any prohibition against treating all 
caregivers, men and women alike, differently or less favorably.‖). For the most part, though, the 
management-side attorneys advise (at least in published sources) that employers should look to 
whether their policies need revision, and recommend that employers genuinely try to help 
caregivers balance work with caregiving. See, e.g., Anderson & Grosshans, supra note 91.  
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interpretations have been subject to a relatively low level of 
deference in the courts,
122
 and because of the problems inherent in 
 
 On the plaintiffs‘ side, attorneys tend to emphasize the success rate of FRD claims, and to 
explain the varied theories under which employees may win FRD suits. See Malalis & Neilan, 
supra note 91, at 35. In addition, they emphasize the need for change in the work world, and 
litigation‘s role in effecting that change. See Malalis & Neilan, supra note 91, at 38 (―By aiding 
employees subjected to FRD, trial lawyers can help change how workers who are caregivers are 
treated.‖).  
 122. Traditionally, courts have been deferential to agency interpretations of the statutes 
they administer. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the 
Supreme Court held that, where Congress has not spoken directly to an issue of statutory 
interpretation, ―the question for the court is whether the agency‘s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.‖ 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). While the ―court need not 
conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to 
uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question 
initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding. Id. at 843 n.11. ―There is an express [or implied] 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statue by 
regulation.‖ Id. at 843–44. The only limit on agency determinations is that they may not be 
―arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.‖ Id. at 844. This ―principle of 
deference to administrative interpretations‖ recognizes that statutory construction often involves 
a choice among conflicting policy goals, a decision better made by the agency whose task it is 
to enforce congressional intent than by courts. Id. at 844–45.  
 On the other hand, one commentator, Theodore Wern, has described the EEOC as a 
second-class agency. Wern, supra note 85, at 1535 (citing Ruth Colker, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 144–46 (1999); 
Jamie A. Yavelberg, Revival of Skidmore v. Swift: Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations after EEOC v. Aramco, 42 DUKE L.J. 166, 200 (1992)). Wern‘s study shows 
that the rate of Supreme Court deference to EEOC interpretations is lower than the overall rate 
of Supreme Court deference to agency interpretations under the Chevron rule. Id. at 1549–50. 
Wern notes first that ―under Title VII, the EEOC [unlike other agencies] is authorized to 
promulgate only interpretive or procedural guidelines and not regulations with the force of 
law.‖ Id. at 1552.  
 Initially, the Supreme Court treated the EEOC with ―great deference.‖ Id. at 1552–54 
(citing EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988); EEOC v. Associated Dry 
Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 604 (1981); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 
66 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).  
 However, the Supreme Court soon noted that ―because Congress ‗did not confer upon the 
EEOC the authority to promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to [Title VII],‘ courts may 
accord ‗less weight to such guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has 
declared shall have the force of law.‘‖ Id. at 1554–55 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 
U.S. 125, 141 (1976)).  
 Congress‘s failure to confer normal authority to promulgate regulations with the force of 
law upon the EEOC is only applicable to Title VII. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) and ADA both contain explicit grants of rulemaking authority. Id. at 1556. On the 
other hand, ―[a]lthough the EEOC did receive rulemaking authority under the ADEA and ADA, 
the agency may still choose to promulgate interpretive rules, for which it does not exercise its 
delegated authority.‖ Id. at 1556 n.124. The Guidance falls into this category; it is grounded in 
Title VII and the ADA, but has the force of law of neither.  
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using litigation as the sole anti-discrimination strategy, it seems 
unlikely that the Guidance will have a major impact on the success of 
FRD claims or on the overall incidence of FRD.  
Boydston‘s historical analysis helps us understand that the 
distinction between carework and market work is a new one, and 
supports the argument that change beyond that provided by 
employment discrimination litigation is needed. The historical 
analysis is important because it deconstructs the ―common sense‖ 
assumption that it is natural for caregiving and family work to be 
sharply distinguished from, and deemed irrelevant to, work outside 
the home.
123
 This assumption, rooted in the invisibility of women‘s, 
and—more generally—caregivers‘ work, is destructive in that it asks 
workers to choose between dissociating themselves from their 
caregiving responsibilities or giving up market work altogether in 
order to engage in caregiving. While it may be possible for some 
families to have a member solely devoted to caregiving, it is not 
economically feasible for most to do this. 
Boydston‘s work shows that, as recently as the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the concepts of economic work and domestic 
work were not so strictly separated; workers were seen as being able 
to engage in both, and both were seen as necessary to the survival of 
the family and society generally. Before carework and domestic work 
became ―invisible‖ and part of solely the ―private‖ sphere, they were 
considered part of the real economy. It is this sense of 
indispensability that is missing from current understandings of the 
interaction between market work and carework. Employers now are 
free to ignore carework as irrelevant and unproductive, and to punish 
employees for real or perceived intrusions of the family into the 
 
 Wern attributes part of the EEOC‘s second-class status to its failure to promulgate rules 
with the force of law where it may (such as under the ADA), and to its tendency to issue 
―interim‖ rules that leave the EEOC‘s interpretation in doubt and thus subject to judicial 
reinterpretation. Id. at 1580.  
 123. Reva Siegel‘s work is especially pertinent here. See Siegel, supra note 73. She notes 
that ―[s]ome may find it difficult to imagine that a debate over wives‘ household labor occurred 
in the nineteenth century, but our ‗common sense‘ intuitions about the normal subjects of 
political debate were formed in the aftermath of the industrial revolution, rather than at its 
inception.‖ Siegel, supra note 73, at 1076. Her article aims to ―reconstruc[t] the social universe 
in which it still could be argued that wives‘ work was work, and a debate over the legal status 
of wives‘ household labor made ‗common sense.‘‖ Siegel, supra note 73, at 1076.  
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waged workplace. Courts, legislatures, and the public continue to 
draw upon the recent invention of distinct waged work and carework 
workplaces in order to explain away the reasons that families have a 
difficult time balancing home and work responsibilities. Moreover, 
they refuse to require the market workplace to accommodate the 
public good of caregiving, seeing it as a ―private‖ issue.  
III. PROPOSAL  
A first step toward combating FRD already has been taken. 
Stereotyping evidence of employment discrimination
124
 is a sound 
way to attack the ways that gender, caregiving, and waged work 
intersect with one another. In addition, this evidence highlights to 
courts, employers, and employees that the fundamental problem is 
cultural and social; if not for certain cultural and social 
understandings about the relationship between gender, caregiving, 
and waged work, FRD would be far less prevalent.  
The new Guidance
125
 is a good illustration of the issue, and gives 
notice to employers and employees that stereotypes about caregiving 
are legally passé. Unfortunately, the Guidance is unlikely to have 
much effect beyond this, for several reasons. First, the EEOC‘s 
enforcement guidance does not have the force of law under Title 
VII.
126
 Second, courts grant little deference to the EEOC.
127
 Finally, 
the Guidance creates no new categories of protection or requirements 
for employers.
128
 
Strategies aimed at making it easier for FRD plaintiffs to win in 
discrimination litigation are not enough. Accommodation and 
information, as proposed by Smith,
129
 Schoenbaum,
130
 and Kessler
131
 
are necessary remedies; however, even accommodation is not itself 
sufficient, as it treats caregiving as a problem for the ―real‖ 
 
 124. See supra notes 36–45 and accompanying text.  
 125. Guidance, supra note 86. See supra notes 85–103 and accompanying text.  
 126. See Wern, supra note 85. 
 127. See supra note 122. 
 128. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text.  
 129. Smith, supra note 46. See supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text.  
 130. Schoenbaum, supra note 53. See supra notes 53–60 and accompanying text.  
 131. Kessler, supra note 61. See supra notes 61–71 and accompanying text.  
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workplace to deal with. Merely requiring accommodation for 
caregiving may well lead to employers‘ pre-screening job applicants 
to seek those who are least likely to present caregiving ―problems‖ 
that must be accommodated.
132
 More fundamentally, though, the 
issues of FRD and work-life balance include underlying assumptions 
about ―work‖ and ―home‖ that cannot be addressed solely through 
anti-discrimination or even pro-accommodation legislation.
133
  
As with so many historically rooted problems, to solve the 
problems of FRD and work-life balance, we need to tell a new story. 
The current narrative paints an inaccurate picture of a sharp, 
gendered divide between ―work‖ that brings in the family‘s financial 
resources, and ―home,‖ where love and caregiving are central but 
economically valueless.
134
 The real story, for most of Western 
 
 132. Schoenbaum would continue to hide caregiver status during the hiring phase in order 
to avoid such pre-screening. Schoenbaum, supra note 53, at 99–100. However, given the 
sophistication of management at using behavioral interviewing techniques and the like to find 
other supposedly ―hidden‖ information about prospective employees, this seems to offer little 
protection.  
 133. As Williams and Segal put it:  
The question is whether workplaces will continue to be designed around the bodies 
and life patterns of men, with ―accommodations‖ offered to women, or whether 
workplace norms will be redesigned to take into account the reproductive biology and 
social roles of women and family caregivers, as well.  
 What women need, in other words, is not accommodation but equality. Equality is 
not achieved when women are offered equal opportunity to live up to ideals framed 
around men. True equality requires new norms that take into account the 
characteristics—both social and biological—of women. 
Williams & Segal, supra note 3, at 84–85 (citations omitted). A broader way of framing this 
question is to ask whether workplaces will continue to be designed around the myth that 
workers can or should be completely autonomous and free from caregiving. Saying that this 
means they are ―designed around the bodies and life patterns of men‖ can be seen merely as a 
shorthand for such an idea, as it has been men who were most able to fit that artificial paradigm.  
 134. In arguing that housework‘s real economic value has been undermined by its 
treatment as ―love,‖ Silbaugh advocates the law‘s recognition of the economic value of 
housework. She wants the tax code and divorce law to recognize the economic contributions of 
caregivers. This may well be an important step to increasing the ―visibility‖ of carework and 
toward dismantling the ―ideal worker‖ trope. It differs from my argument, though, in that it 
focuses on how to alleviate the negative effects women suffer as a result of their caregiver 
status. It does not advocate a position for women or men in the spectrum of carework or waged 
work, instead taking the world as it is. See Silbaugh, supra note 6.  
 My argument is more concerned with the effects on waged workers and on society as a 
whole when caregiving is under-valued, invisible, and constrained. The two arguments are 
complementary, in that both solutions probably are necessary to overcome the problems of both 
the inadequate visibility of carework and the inability of many who are both careworkers and 
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history, is revealed by Boydston, in which ―work‖ and ―home‖ were 
one and the same, and in which caregiving and domestic work, while 
largely gendered, were understood to be productive. This perspective, 
which recognizes the economic and human necessity of carework to 
our continued existence, holds out some promise of remedy.  
Of course, telling a new historical story, one that is at odds with 
the one that is comfortably embedded in our collective memory, is a 
difficult task. It begins with scholars‘ and professors‘ active rejection 
of the prevailing ―common sense‖ belief in a sharp dichotomy of 
―work‖ and ―home,‖ and extends to media portrayals of the problems 
of work-life balance that are more accurate.
135
 Too many legal 
scholars and media pundits start from the assumption that America in 
the middle of the twentieth century was representative of historical 
reality for all preceding periods. This assumption must change. 
Historical change does not flow only in one direction; the fact that, in 
popular myth, a certain work-family dynamic prevailed in the mid-
twentieth century does not mean that all preceding periods held 
regressively more concentrated versions of that period‘s norms.  
Historical scholarship already recognizes that change flows multi-
directionally. The legal world needs to catch up to this higher level of 
intellectual rigor. It is not true that there always has been, or always 
must be, a sharp divide between ―work‖ and ―home.‖ The law must 
 
market workers to meet the ―ideal worker‖ standard. Silbaugh herself notes the distinction; she 
takes the position that it is as important to focus on improving the consequences that flow from 
the uneven distribution of home labor as it is to focus on altering that distribution or 
accommodating it in the wage labor market. The importance of focusing on the status of home 
labor is supported by the real differences among women and the variation in their preferences. 
Silbaugh, supra note 6, at 14–15.  
 135. This may include the ―rights talk‖ suggested by Williams & Segal, supra note 3, at 
113–22. They write that rights talk ―redefines work-family conflict, so that it is no longer seen 
as a personal inability to balance one‘s responsibilities, but as a structural problem that requires 
a structural solution.‖ Williams & Siegel, supra note 3, at 114.  
[―Rights talk‖] fuels social and institutional change in complex and iterative ways that 
are not limited to the courtroom. ―Rights talk‖ can change what people feel they are 
entitled to from their employers; what employers feel they need to provide to their 
employees; what type of diversity training is provided; what financial advisors may 
recommend to improve the bottom line; what human resource personnel recommend to 
recruit and retain good employees; and what corporate counsel advise their clients to 
do in order to comply with the law and avoid liability.  
Williams & Siegel, supra note 3, at 121. 
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recognize this. The law, unlike historical scholarship, is well 
positioned to change these understandings by changing the 
underlying story.  
Carework needs to be visible once again. No more is this purely 
the argument of those concerned about women‘s economic, social, 
and political economy;
136
 it is the concern of all workers whose lives 
are impoverished by the ―ideal worker‖ norms, and of all caregivers 
whose caregiving and market work is devalued.
137
 The rush ―home‖ 
by many workers—especially mothers—away from the waged 
workforce, is a symptom of the inadequate recognition of carework in 
the workplace and the law. If the workplace and society were more 
accommodating and ―seeing‖ of the necessity of carework, caregivers 
(who in fact are most employees) would be better able to engage in 
both caregiving and market work. This may take the form of legally 
mandated leave periods, flexible work, or governmental benefits for 
caregivers, who perform an essential function that benefits society at 
large. In addition to these legal supports, the new cultural discourse 
about the rigid and largely unexamined requirements of the 
workplace must continue to expand, informed especially by historical 
understandings of the relationship between work and home.  
Since our economy no longer is reliant on home production,
138
 as 
 
 136. Because of the decline in position that women suffered as a result of their 
reclassification as ―dependents,‖ the early women‘s movement largely was concerned with 
―valuing‖ domestic labor. See Silbaugh, supra note 6, at 24–25.  
 137. It is certainly of interest to those who are concerned about racial and class equality, as 
well as the well-being of men. See infra notes 142–44.  
 138. Another way of looking at the problem is to realize that, beginning with the post-Civil 
War industrial era, there began a declining economic need to have a full-time domestic worker 
in each family. Since most goods that formerly were made at home could be more efficiently 
purchased in the cash economy, caregivers‘ and domestic producers‘ tangible economic 
contributions gradually were reduced. This is not to say that they made no economic 
contribution; the domestic and caregiving work that they provided undoubtedly was necessary 
and helped to support wage-earning members of the family. However, their contribution was no 
longer as concretely real or obvious as it formerly had been. Though this Note largely has 
assumed that household labor is economically productive, it must be conceded that there no 
longer are as many arenas in which a typical American household worker actually can 
contribute to the financial well-being of the household, but caregiving and a great deal of 
household maintenance remain important, and unlikely to decline.  
 The decline in actual home production of tangible goods coincided with a century-long 
move toward viewing women as the ―dependents‖ of men, rather than as partners in work, 
which Boydston identifies. It is not hard to see why women were ready to move for greater 
social, political, and economic equality, and for the renewed ability to engage in market work 
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it largely was in the period Boydston studies, it is important that all 
adults who are willing and able have the opportunity to engage in 
waged work. Without this, we may see a return to the not-so-distant 
past of women‘s economic subordination, as they and other 
caregivers are driven from the means of economic independence.
139
 
We are firmly entrenched in a money-based, waged-work economy, 
but we must learn to deal with the timeless demands of caregiving, 
which will always be with us. A proper historical perspective will 
help legal scholars to arrive at new ways of conceptualizing work and 
home, leading to more balanced lives for all workers.  
CONCLUSION 
Legally mandated employer accommodation and government 
support of Americans‘ caregiving responsibilities would be good for 
everyone, whether caregivers or not. Historically informed discourse 
about the proper positions of work and family life will help these 
reforms succeed and will promote even more egalitarian policies and 
practices. Their most obvious effect would be to make it easier for 
 
without stigma; they had been reduced in the cultural psyche from their historic position as 
economically important, productive members of the family, to economic ―dependents‖ whose 
only contribution was in what was seen as valueless—and laborless—caregiving. This vision of 
caregiving remains, though women have been able to move (back) into the visible workforce 
(where they had been through most of human history). Now, though, their visible workplace is 
set up along the model of the ―ideal worker,‖ who has no family responsibilities. They must 
pretend as though they have no caregiving responsibilities—they must carry out both the 
―visible‖ and ―invisible‖ work.  
 139. Katharine Silbaugh puts it this way:  
We have seen the consequences of home responsibilities on women‘s prospects for 
equal participation in the wage labor market revealed and debated in the employment 
law context. But interference with equal paid labor force participation is not the only 
problem with the gendered distribution of home labor. The distribution of labor is 
problematic because the status of home labor in law is inferior to that of wage 
labor. . . . [T]he legal consequences of home labor do not bring the kind of financial 
rewards, security, and recognition that accompany paid labor. 
Silbaugh, supra note 6, at 14. If women are to retain the social and legal rights that the women‘s 
rights movement won, they must retain the ability to engage in the labor that society sees as 
productive. This is true both in a practical sense, as women who are able to provide for 
themselves financially are far less likely to be oppressed, and in a more abstract cultural sense, 
as Boydston‘s work shows that the decline in social recognition of women‘s work coincides 
with a decline in women‘s power.  
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caregivers to earn a living while tending to their family 
responsibilities.  
There are other benefits that are less tangible, but no less 
important. Accommodation, support, and discourse would raise 
public awareness and recognition of the economic and social 
importance of caregiving. The social importance and legitimacy 
attached to an activity largely is a function of how it is treated in the 
law, in the economy, and in cultural assumptions. If these forces were 
to recognize the necessity and value of caregiving, the public would 
come to recognize that value as well. The awareness of caregiving‘s 
undeniable public benefits, coupled with a more accurate historical 
understanding of caregiving and domestic labor, will facilitate 
solutions of some of the problems of our society that are hardest to 
reach.
140
 One of these problems is gender inequity for women
141
 and 
for men.
142
 The class
143
 and racial
144
 divisions
145
 of caregiving and 
 
 140. I am in no way arguing that the problems that I list are the most fundamental or 
pressing—clearly poverty, lack of opportunity, racism, and crime are among the largest, most 
concrete problems of American society. However, I posit that a recognition of the social value 
of caregiving and its historical position will go toward alleviating some of these problems, in 
indirect ways. As parents find it easier to work and raise children, as employment is broadened 
by increased use of part-time or flextime policies, as the idea of ―family values‖ is expanded to 
include support for poor and minority families, we may find that some of these larger problems 
are reduced.  
 141. It is undisputed that women do most of the domestic labor and caregiving in this 
country, and that most of these caregivers also work in the marketplace. For an analysis of the 
amount of time women in various groups spend on housework, see Nancy Staudt, Taxing 
Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1581 nn.40–41 (1996) (noting that women spend 50 hours a 
week on housework and perform 70–80 percent of household chores); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & 
ANN MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT (2003).  
 A rule that requires employer accommodation and government support for caregivers, as 
well as increased historical understanding of domestic labor, will improve the situation of most 
women in several ways. First, women‘s ―second shift‖ of work at home will be recognized, 
accommodated, and supported financially; this will result in greater respect for their caregiving 
work and thereby their massive contribution to society. Second, if women are empowered in 
their ability to work in the marketplace while engaging in caregiving, they will be more likely 
to do both. This ability should lead to increased opportunities for women to find both 
satisfaction and the most efficient use of their skills, and perhaps a leveling of the income and 
success gaps that women face in the workplace. Moreover, if caregiving is recognized as a 
legally and economically important task (rather than merely the expression of ―love‖ by 
dependents who could do no other work as well), the burden of caregiving may become more 
equal across genders. Finally, men may no longer lose status if they engage in it, and women 
will benefit by a more equitable distribution of labor.  
 142. Caregiving and market work both are productive activities, and both also are, to many 
people, personally enriching. Men‘s lives long have been impoverished by the ahistorical 
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assumption that their only legitimate role was as a ―good provider‖ of financial support. Cf. 
John Leland, More Men Take the Lead Role in Caring for Elderly Parents, N.Y. TIMES, 
November 29, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/us/29sons.html? 
partner=permalink&exprod=permalink (discussing rise in number of men caring for elders, 
while showing the difficulties these men encounter because of their confrontation of the 
breadwinner stereotype and feminization of caregiving). Recognition of and respect for 
caregiving as a social and economic necessity by law, economics, and cultural memory will 
enable men to engage more easily in more caregiving than they currently do, because it will 
carry less of a social and economic price.  
 143. For many American families, there is no option of having a mother who ―opts out‖ of 
the workforce. These families bear the brunt of FRD, as their members are more likely to be in 
jobs that have little tolerance for absenteeism or flexibility in scheduling, and they are unable to 
afford the cost of a parent dropping out of the workforce. The problem obviously is 
compounded for single parents. In addition, the cost of quality childcare places many of these 
parents in a bind, as childcare takes a large chunk of a lower income, while it is not possible—
as it is for many higher-income families—to make the economically rational choice for a lower-
paid parent to quit work. Legal and economic accommodation and support for caregiving would 
help these families to juggle the time and money demands of work and caregiving. For some 
families, this support may take the form of subsidized child care. See Dowd, supra note 71, at 
456–61.  
 144. A new understanding of caregiving may help to alleviate racial inequities in this 
country. While this Note has attempted to remain race-neutral, race neutrality is nearly 
impossible to achieve (and perhaps undesirable, since ―neutrality‖ often is code for adherence 
to the dominant culture); this Note is unintentionally imbued with the perspective of whites. 
Social support for caregiving in all its forms, not just ―traditional‖ white nuclear families 
(which family form has been supported by our tax and other laws, see Symposium, Women, 
Equity and Federal Tax Policy, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1999)), is necessary. Research 
shows that family forms and trends tend to be different across racial groups, a fact caregiving 
policies need to recognize and accommodate, rather than punish. A history of nontraditional 
families ―disadvantages black women not because achieving the ‗traditional‘ family form is 
desirable, but because the alternative family forms which black women are likely to experience 
are not the product of diversity or choice, and are inadequately supported.‖ Dowd, supra note 
71, at 466–67.  
 145. Dorothy Roberts has identified a distinction between ―spiritual‖ and ―menial‖ 
housework that perpetuates racial and class divides while advantaging white, upper-class 
women. Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 
55–56 (1997). Professor Roberts writes:  
Some work in the home is considered spiritual: it is valued highly because it is thought 
to be essential to the proper functioning of the household and the moral upbringing of 
children. Other domestic work is considered menial: it is devalued because it is 
strenuous and unpleasant and is thought to require little moral or intellectual skill. 
While the ideological opposition of home and work distinguishes men from women, 
the ideological distinction between spiritual and menial housework fosters inequality 
among women. Spiritual housework is associated with privileged white women; 
menial housework is associated with minority, immigrant, and working class women. 
Recent welfare reform laws, which require poor women to leave home to assume 
menial jobs, highlight the importance of identifying and shattering this dichotomy in 
women‘s domestic labor. 
Id. at 51.  
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domestic labor also may be lessened by a new (and yet historical) 
approach to caregiving. 
These hopes for a better understanding of the place of caregiving 
may seem idealistic and unattainable, but society needs change in the 
law and cultural understandings surrounding caregiving. Balance 
between paid work and family responsibilities is an important, yet 
largely unattainable goal for many people. At the same time, both 
market economics and a concern for human flourishing should 
prompt us to make changes that will enable all people to engage in 
fulfilling work that is the highest and best use of their skills while 
retaining the ability to form and maintain families.  
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